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i n December 2015, the Paris Agreement1—a new global agreement to combat climate change—was adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In prepara-
tion of this agreement, countries submitted national plans that spell out 
their intentions for addressing the climate change challenge after 20202. 
These Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) address 
a range of issues, which can relate to avoiding, adapting or coping with 
climate change, among other things. Nevertheless, targets and actions 
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are core components. At 
this point, the INDCs are not final and can be modified up until the 
time the Paris Agreement is ratified. However, for now they represent 
our best understanding of the climate actions countries intend to pursue 
after 2020.
The overarching climate goal of the Paris Agreement is to hold “the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre- 
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”1. This climate goal represents the 
level of climate change that governments agree would prevent danger-
ous interference with the climate system, while ensuring sustainable food 
production and economic development3,4, and is the result of interna-
tional discussions over multiple decades5. Limiting warming to any level 
implies that the total amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) that can ever be 
emitted into the atmosphere is finite6. From a geophysical perspective, 
global CO2 emissions thus need to become net zero7,8. About two thirds 
of the available budget for keeping warming to below 2 °C have already 
been emitted9–11, and increasing trends in CO2 emissions12 indicate that 
global emissions urgently need to start to decline so as to not foreclose 
the possibility of holding warming to well below 2 °C (refs 13, 14). The 
window for limiting warming to below 1.5 °C with high probability and 
without temporarily exceeding that level already seems to have closed15. 
The Paris Agreement implicitly acknowledges these insights and aims to 
reach a global peak in GHG emissions as soon as possible together with 
achieving “a balance” between anthropogenic emissions and removals 
of GHGs in the second half of this century. Both targets are in principle 
consistent with the temperature objective of the Agreement16,17, but beg 
the broader question of whether current INDCs are already putting the 
world on a path towards achieving them.
Besides the climate question, the first round of INDCs also raises 
many other issues. These include whether efforts are distributed equi-
tably among countries; how much adaptation may be required given 
the current level of mitigation ambition; how ‘intended’ national pro-
posals will be implemented; how they will be financed; and the extent 
to which the INDCs contribute to the achievement of other goals of the 
UNFCCC by building on institutions that can support adaptation to 
climate change, technology advancement, development path transfor-
mation, sustainable development and enhanced awareness. Although 
these issues are important for many countries, they fall outside the scope 
of this analysis.
In this Perspective, we assess the implications of the current INDCs 
for GHG emissions, including the main factors and uncertainties that 
influence the levels of GHG emissions in 2030—the latest year covered 
by the vast majority of INDCs—and we explore the consistency of these 
reductions with the objective of the Paris Agreement (to keep warming 
well below 2 °C and pursue efforts towards 1.5 °C). This work updates and 
expands work undertaken in the framework of the 2015 United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report18—an author-
itative annual assessment that has tracked climate policy action over the 
past six years, and provides a synthesis of a wide range of INDC model-
ling studies19–29 that are available in the public domain. The number of 
INDCs considered by the studies that we assess here ranges from the 118 
INDCs submitted by 1 October 2015 to the 160 INDCs submitted by 
12 December 2015 (Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). These 118 to 
160 INDCs cover emissions from 145 to 187 out of 195 Parties to the 
UNFCCC, which in turn were responsible for roughly 88% to more than 
96% of global GHG emissions in 201230. We also look at projections of 
global-mean temperature increase over the twenty-first century that 
would be consistent with the INDCs, and at post-2030 implications for 
limiting warming to no more than 2 °C. Finally, we discuss options to 
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further reduce global GHG emissions in 2030 from their INDC levels 
towards levels that are more consistent with a long-term global pathway 
that limits warming to well below 2 °C.
We use four scenario groups to frame the implications of the INDCs 
for global GHG emissions in 2030: no-policy baseline scenarios, cur-
rent-policy scenarios, INDC scenarios and least-cost 2 °C scenarios. Their 
definitions and descriptions are provided in Box 1.
Aggregate emissions impact of INDCs
A first, obvious question to ask is what the submitted INDCs deliver in 
terms of GHG emissions out to 2030. What sounds like simple arith-
metic turns out to be a more complicated accounting exercise with an 
array of possible outcomes. Some countries provide a range instead of 
a single number of emissions reductions in their INDCs. Many INDCs 
lack necessary details, such as clarity on sectors and gases covered, details 
on the impact of listed mitigation actions, different metrics to aggregate 
gases, details on base year or reference values from which reductions or 
improvements would be measured, or accounting practices related to land 
use and the use of specific market mechanisms31. This murkiness compli-
cates a precise estimate of their impact on emissions. Finally, some of the 
actions listed in INDCs are, either implicitly or explicitly, conditional on 
other factors, such as the availability of financial or technological support. 
All these factors can be interpreted differently and influence the range of 
possible outcomes. In our assessment, we distinguish between a condi-
tional and an unconditional INDC scenario, with associated uncertain-
ties. Interestingly, the Paris Agreement does not adopt such distinction, 
and instead defers any discussion on features of countries’ contributions 
to further negotiations.
Unconditionally, the INDCs are expected to result in global GHG 
emissions of about 55 (52–58; 10th–90th percentile range over all 
studies unless otherwise stated) billion metric tonnes of annual CO2-
equivalent emissions (Gt CO2-eq yr−1; Box 1, Fig. 1, Supplementary Text 
1) in 2030. This is a reduction of around 9 (7–13) Gt CO2-eq yr−1 by 
2030 relative to the median no-policy baseline scenario estimate and of 
around 4 (2–8) Gt CO2-eq yr−1 relative to the median current-policy 
scenario estimate (Supplementary Table 5). Putting this into context, 
global GHG emissions in 2010 are estimated at about 48 Gt CO2-eq yr−1 
(46–50 Gt CO2-eq yr−1; range across studies, Supplementary Table 2), and 
our median no-policy baseline estimate reaches about 65 Gt CO2-eq yr−1 
by 2030.
A number of countries place conditions—for example, the provision 
of international finance—on all or part of their INDC. Some countries 
(such as Mexico, Indonesia and Morocco) included a range of reduction 
targets in their INDC and attach conditions to the implementation of 
the more ambitious end. Other countries indicate that their entire INDC 
is conditional. Of the INDCs submitted by 12 December 2015, roughly 
45% came with both conditional and unconditional components; 
about a third was conditional only; and the remainder did not specify 
conditions32. When we assume in our evaluation that all conditions are 
met and conditional INDCs are fully implemented, estimated global 
GHG emissions end up about 2.4 (1.2− 4.8) Gt CO2-eq yr−1 lower in 
2030 compared to the unconditional INDC scenario case (full range 
across six available estimates, Supplementary Text 1, Supplementary 
Table 5).
Comparing the INDC scenario (what countries propose as their con-
tribution to the international agreement) to the current-policy scenario 
(what countries implement domestically) provides lessons on the extent 
to which additional national policies are necessary to achieve the intended 
2030 emissions reductions18. Projected emissions under current policies 
that match (or are lower than) those under the INDC can result either 
from a proactive and coordinated domestic policy response consistent 
with the INDC or from an INDC that is explicitly designed not to require 
further policy effort. Likewise, projected emissions under current policy 
that exceed those under the INDC can result from a relatively ambitious 
INDC, from a lack of domestic climate policy, or a combination thereof. 
Therefore, this comparison alone cannot adequately reflect the overall 
level of ambition.
For a number of countries (such as Russia and Ukraine), the INDC 
targets suggest that emission levels above their estimated no-policy base-
line or current-policy scenario will be reached. These countries are thus 
expected to overachieve their INDC targets by default. Under the rules 
of the Kyoto Protocol, over-delivery on a target would have generated 
surplus emission allowances by the quantity the target level is overa-
chieved. These allowances can then be traded with other countries, who 
apply them to achieve their own GHG reduction target. Such a system 
could also be developed under the Paris Agreement, which allows for 
Box 1
scenario definitions
Scenarios represent alternative images of the future, or “[stories] about what happened in the future”76. They are neither predictions nor forecasts77, but tools 
to understand how the future might unfold under a consistent set of assumptions. In this analysis, we use four types of scenarios, drawn from a wide variety of 
sources.
No-policy baseline scenarios. These are emissions projections that assume that no new climate policies have been put into place from  
2005 onwards. We select these scenarios from the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database16, which is hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA, https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB/). By design, these no-policy baseline scenarios exclude climate policies, but may include other policies that can 
influence emissions and are implemented for other reasons, such as energy efficiency or energy security policies.
Current-policy scenarios. These consider the most recent estimates of global emissions and take into account implemented national policies. This is different 
from the INDC scenarios (described below), which reflect international pledges and intended policies. Here, we draw these scenarios from three global  
analyses19,29,78.
INDC scenarios. These project how global GHG emissions evolve under a successful implementation of the INDCs. These projections are based on ten global 
INDC analyses19–29 (Supplementary Table 2 provides an overview), in which calculations can be based on official estimates from countries or on documents 
submitted to the UNFCCC (such as national GHG inventories, national communications, biennial reports or biennial update reports). INDCs were submitted 
before the Paris summit; under the Paris Agreement, future mitigation contributions will be referred to as NDCs, without the ‘intended’.
2 °C scenarios. These are idealized global scenarios limiting warming to well below 2 °C, keeping open the option of strengthening the global temperature target 
to 1.5 °C. These scenarios are based on a subset of scenarios from the IPCC AR5 Scenario Database (Supplementary Table 3) that meet the following criteria: 
they have a greater than 66% probability of keeping warming to below 2 °C by 2100 (this probability does not drop below 60% at any point during the entire 
twenty-first century); until 2020, they assume that actions that were pledged earlier under the UNFCCC Cancun Agreement are fully implemented; and, after 
2020, they distribute emission reductions across regions, gases and sectors so that the total discounted costs of the necessary global reductions are minimized. 
These scenarios distribute emissions reductions among regions in the most cost-optimal way, and are often referred to as least-cost or cost-optimal trajectories. 
However, this does not imply that the actual costs to achieve this cannot be distributed differently, for example, on the basis of other equity principles79.  
A separate set of scenarios is used to examine the post-2030 implications of current INDCs for 2 °C (Supplementary Table 4).
All scenarios are expressed in terms of billions of tonnes of global annual CO2-equivalent emissions (Gt CO2-eq yr−1). CO2 equivalence of GHGs has been  
calculated by means of 100-year global warming potentials80.
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the voluntary use of “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes”. 
However, the extent to which such a mechanism will ultimately be devel-
oped and used remains unclear, because it will require features, infor-
mation and accounting of contributions to become much more precise 
than they are now. Different modelling teams treat these surpluses in 
different ways, which adds an uncertainty of about 1 Gt CO2-eq yr−1 to 
the estimates presented here.
Confounding factors
The literature synthesized in this assessment reveals a wide range of esti-
mates of future emissions under nominally similar scenarios (see small 
symbols in Fig. 1). These differences can stem from a number of factors, 
including modelling methods, input data and assumptions regarding 
country intent. Our review identifies four key factors that contribute to 
the discrepancies and differences between the various 2030 emissions 
estimates.
Incomplete coverage
Several global and national sectors as well as countries are not covered 
by INDCs. Often, emissions estimates for sectors that are not included 
under INDCs range widely. This is the case for, for example, global 
emissions from international aviation (despite an industry pledge out-
side the UNFCCC33) and maritime transport, or the national non-CO2 
GHG emissions from China. Subtracting national sectors that are not 
covered, INDCs cover at least 8 percentage points less of global emis-
sions than the 96% indicated earlier (Supplementary Text 2). Under the 
Paris Agreement, developing countries are encouraged to move over time 
to economy-wide targets, so that future analyses should become more 
comprehensive. Countries that are not a UNFCCC Party or have not yet 
put forward an INDC are also studied in less depth, but represent only a 
diminishing amount of global emissions (about 1%–2%). Finally, studies 
themselves make specific choices about which INDCs to cover or focus 
on, which in turn influence projected emissions.
Uncertain projections
GHG emission projections of countries that have submitted INDCs are 
uncertain, particularly if targets are not unambiguously translatable in 
absolute emission reductions. Most INDCs do define straight-forward, 
absolute GHG emission targets (in units of CO2-eq in a given year or 
period), or targets that can be relatively easily translated into absolute 
levels (for example, a reduction from a fixed historical base year), but this 
is not always the case. About 75 INDCs are defined relative to hypothetical 
‘business-as-usual’ or reference scenarios in the absence of climate pol-
icy32. In some cases governments do not define their reference scenario, 
and in other cases official projections differ substantially from those from 
international and national modelling teams. Overall, these uncertainties 
should become smaller, because the Paris decisions request countries to 
ensure some methodological consistency of future submissions. Another 
complicating factor is that several countries put forward targets that do 
not directly specify emissions (such as a renewable energy target) or 
targets on emissions intensity (for instance, improvements of the ratio 
of carbon emissions, CO2, to economic output, GDP). If the expected 
GDP growth rate is not provided, additional assumptions are required to 
quantify the implied absolute level of GHG emissions and these assump-
tions differ across modelling groups. For example, the estimated emis-
sions for China for 2030 under its INDC range from 12.8 Gt CO2-eq yr−1 
to 15.0 Gt CO2-eq yr−1 in different studies22,34,35. At least seven other 
INDCs, including India’s, are subject to the same kind of uncertainties 
(Supplementary Table 1). Finally, many countries (about 30, amount-
ing to approximately 6% of global emissions) include mere qualitative 
descriptions of mitigation actions in their INDCs, which complicate a 
precise quantification.
Land-use-related emissions
Various approaches exist to account for emissions from land use, land-
use change and forestry, and countries can use an accounting approach 
of their choice in their INDCs. Examples of possible approaches are 
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Figure 1 | Global greenhouse gas emissions 
as implied by INDCs compared to no-policy 
baseline, current-policy and 2 °C scenarios. 
White lines show the median of each range. 
The white dashed line shows the median 
estimate of what the INDCs would deliver if all 
conditions are met. The 20th–80th-percentile 
ranges are shown for the no-policy baseline 
and 2 °C scenarios. For current-policy and 
INDC scenarios, the minimum–maximum and 
10th–90th-percentile range across all assessed 
studies are given, respectively. Symbols represent 
single studies, and are offset slightly to increase 
readability. Dashed brown lines connect data 
points for each study. Scenarios are described  
in Box 1.
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to include land-use-related CO2 emissions and removals as part of the 
national total, much like any other sector (an approach favoured by, 
for example, Brazil and USA), or to apply accounting rules similar to 
the ones under the Kyoto Protocol (which are favoured by, for example, 
the European Union and New Zealand, and possibly by Russia). These 
accounting rules can have a substantial effect on the emissions of indi-
vidual countries in 2025 and 203036 and are associated with substantial 
uncertainties. Although some INDCs explicitly exclude land-use-related 
emissions from their targets, many INDCs that include land use in their 
targets do not specify an accounting approach.
Historical emissions and metrics
Historical emission estimates come with their associated uncertainties. 
For example, recently, global 2010 GHG emissions have been estimated 
at 49 Gt CO2-eq yr−1 (± 4.5 Gt CO2-eq yr−1, 90% confidence interval)37. 
Model teams apply their own estimate of historical emissions in their 
INDC analyses (Fig. 1), and both INDCs and analysts use varying met-
rics to translate GHG emissions into units of CO2-equivalence. Even if 
these discrepancies can be harmonized38 or corrected for, their variation 
increases the uncertainty surrounding INDC estimates.
Optimal 2 °C pathways
Having quantified the GHG implications of the INDCs by 2030, the 
question remains whether these levels are consistent with the Paris 
Agreement’s aim of holding warming to well below 2 °C. As indicated 
earlier, limiting warming to any level requires net CO2 emissions to 
become zero at some point in time and, given the small remaining car-
bon budget, this moment is estimated to be before the end of this cen-
tury for a 2 °C limit11,17. The Paris Agreement’s aim of reaching net-zero 
GHG emissions in the second half of the century goes even further. For 
some non-CO2 emissions, in particular those related to agriculture, only 
limited mitigation options have been identified39. Therefore, net-zero 
CO2 emissions are always achieved before achieving net-zero GHG emis-
sions. Integrated energy–economy models are used extensively to model 
pathways that can achieve this feat at global least cost16. Here, we use the 
Scenario Database that accompanied the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chang (IPCC) to explore such 
cost-optimal 2 °C pathways from 2020 onward (Box 1).
Comparing these cost-optimal 2 °C scenarios to the INDC projections 
shows a large discrepancy (Fig. 1). The median cost-optimal path towards 
keeping warming to below 2 °C (starting reductions in 2020) and the 
emissions currently implied by the unconditional INDCs differ by about 
14 (10–16) Gt CO2-eq yr−1 in 2030. Even if the conditions that are linked 
to some INDCs are met (see earlier), this difference remains of the order 
of 11 Gt CO2-eq yr−1. The high end of this range (16 Gt CO2-eq yr−1) cor-
responds roughly to the 2010 emissions of China and USA combined; the 
lower end (about 10.5 Gt CO2-eq yr−1) to the sum of the emissions of Brazil, 
the European Union, India and Russia. Thus, the INDCs clearly do not put 
the world on a least-cost path towards limiting warming to well below 2 °C.
Any global emission scenario reflects an idealized representation of the 
world. This is not different for the cost-optimal 2 °C scenarios that were 
used above as a reference. The strength of such cost-optimal scenarios lies 
in the fact that they provide an assessment of the potential for emission 
reductions in a world that collaborates globally towards limiting climate 
change and attempts to do this at lowest overall cost. Other scenarios in 
the literature model other, more imperfect futures, for example, those 
in which climate action is delayed by a few decades13,14,40,41, in which 
countries and regions are not collaborating from the beginning42, or in 
which the strength of local institutions affects the willingness to invest43. 
Such scenarios help us to explore the post-2030 implications of the cur-
rent INDCs.
Post-2030 implications of INDCs
A large share of the potential warming until 2100 is determined not just 
by the INDCs until 2025 or 2030, but also by what happens afterwards. 
Several conceptual approaches can be followed to extend INDCs into 
the future, which basically assume that climate action stalls, continues or 
accelerates. Stalling action is often modelled by assuming that emissions 
return to a no-climate-policy trajectory after 2030; continuing action by 
assuming that the level of post-2030 action is similar to pre-2030 action 
on the basis of a metric of choice (for example, extrapolating INDC trends 
in terms of carbon-price development or emissions intensity of the econ-
omy); and accelerating action by post-2030 action that goes beyond such 
a level. Because of the path-dependence and inertia of the global energy 
system44,45, the INDCs have a critical role in preparing what can come 
after 2030.
Each of the above-mentioned approaches leads to different global 
temperature outcomes, even when starting from the same INDC assess-
ment for 2030. It is therefore essential to spell out post-2030 assumptions 
to understand global temperature projections for the twenty-first cen-
tury based on the INDCs. As a conservative interpretation of the Paris 
Agreement, we here assume that climate action continues after 2030 at 
a level of ambition that is similar to that of the INDCs (Supplementary 
Text 3). The assumption that climate action will continue or accelerate 
over time is supported by the Agreement’s requirement that the successive 
nationally determined contribution of each country must represent a pro-
gression beyond the earlier contributions, and reflect the highest possible 
ambition, of that country. Stalling climate action after 2030 would be in 
contradiction with the provisions of the Paris Agreement.
Under these assumptions of continued climate action, the 2030 
unconditional-INDC emission range is roughly consistent with a 
median warming relative to pre-industrial levels of 2.6–3.1 °C (median, 
2.9 °C; full scenario projection uncertainty, 2.2–3.5 °C; Table 1, Fig. 2b, 
Supplementary Fig. 1), with warming continuing its increase afterwards. 
This is an improvement on the current-policy and no-policy baseline 
scenarios, whose median projections suggest about 3.2 °C and more than 
4 °C of temperature rise by 2100, respectively. The successful implemen-
tation of all conditional INDCs would decrease our median estimate by 
an additional 0.2 °C, but keeps the outcome far from the world the Paris 
Agreement is aiming for, with well-below 2 °C and 1.5 °C of warming. 
Moreover, all above-mentioned values represent median projections. 
Because the climate response to GHG emissions remains uncertain46, 
it is also possible that substantially higher temperatures will materialize 
with compelling likelihoods (Table 1). For example, at the 66th percentile 
level, warming under the unconditional INDCs is projected to be about 
0.3 °C higher (3.2 °C, with a range of 2.9–3.4 °C). Finally, the INDC cases 
that we assess here will exceed the available carbon budget for keeping 
warming to below 2 °C by 2030 with 66% probability (that is, roughly 
Table 1 | Estimates of global temperature rise for INDC and other scenarios categories
Scenario Global-mean temperature rise by 2100 (in °C) that is not exceeded with the given probability
50% 66% 90%
No-policy baseline 4.1 (3.5–4.5) [3.1–4.8] 4.5 (3.9–5.1) [3.4–5.4] 5.6 (4.8–6.3) [4.2–6.8]
Current policy 3.2 (3.1–3.4) [2.7–3.8] 3.6 (3.4–3.7) [2.9–4.1] 4.4 (4.2–4.6) [3.6–5.2]
INDC (unconditional) 2.9 (2.6–3.1) [2.2–3.5] 3.2 (2.9–3.4) [2.4–3.8] 3.9 (3.5–4.2) [2.8–4.7]
INDC (conditional) 2.7 (2.5–2.9) [2.1–3.2] 3.0 (2.7–3.1) [2.2–3.6] 3.7 (3.3–3.9) [2.6–4.4]
For each scenario, temperature values at the 50%, 66% and 90% probability levels are provided for the median emission estimates, as well as the 10th–90th-percentile range of emissions estimates 
(in parentheses) and the same estimates when also including scenario projection uncertainty (in brackets). Temperature increases are relative to pre-industrial levels (1850–1900), and are derived 
from simulations with a probabilistic set-up with the simple model MAGICC  
(refs 10, 68–70, Supplementary Text 3).
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750–800 Gt CO2-eq implied emissions under the INDCs during the 
2011–2030 period compared to the 750–1,400 Gt CO2-eq available; 
Supplementary Text 3, Supplementary Table 6, Fig. 2d). The budget for 
never exceeding 1.5 °C with a 50% probability (550–600 Gt CO2-eq) will be 
entirely gone, indicating that active removal of CO2 at a later point in time 
will be required to return to within this budget (Supplementary Table 6). 
Median warming under the INDCs is projected to cross the 1.5 °C and 2 °C 
limits by 2030–2045 and 2045–2075, respectively (Supplementary Fig. 4).
The question thus arises whether global temperature rise can be kept 
to well below 2 °C with accelerated action after 2030. Global scenarios 
that aim to keep warming to below 2 °C and that achieve this objective 
from 2030 GHG emissions similar to those from the INDC range have 
been assessed in detail by recent large-scale model-comparison pro-
jects16,40. Our re-analysis of these scenarios shows that even with accel-
erated action after 2030, options to keep warming to well below 2 °C from 
current INDCs are severely limited, particularly if some key mitigation 
technologies do not scale up as anticipated. This is easy to understand 
if one appreciates that even if all INDCs are successfully implemented 
by 2030, the 2 °C carbon budget might already be virtually exhausted by 
that time (see earlier and Fig. 2d). The Paris Agreement does not define 
precisely what its “well-below 2 °C” aim means. Typically, policymakers in 
the UNFCCC have been concerned about limiting warming to below 2 °C 
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Figure 2 | Temperature implications of current INDCs. a, GHG emission 
ranges (20th–80th percentile) of scenarios from the IPCC AR5 Scenario 
Database with constant policy assumptions from 2010 onwards (blue- 
to-green shaded ranges), grouped per estimated median global-mean 
temperature increase in 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels (1850–1900), 
and range of the scenario subset limiting warming to below 2 °C by 2100 
with 50%–66% likelihood (dark orange) from year-2030 INDC levels. 
The vertical orange lines show the unconditional INDC range in 2025 
and 2030, as shown in Fig. 1. The 2 °C range shown in Fig. 1 starts global 
least-cost mitigation action in 2020 instead of 2010 and is not included 
here. b, Relationship between global GHG emission levels in 2030 and 
median global-mean temperature increase by 2100 based on scenarios 
shown in a. Each dot represents a single scenario. The blue line shows a 
smoothing spline fit (R2 ≈ 0.93) and the blue-shaded area shows fits to the 
5th and 95th percentile over all points. Comparing the central fit with the 
range of year-2030 GHG emissions implied by the unconditional INDCs 
shows that INDCs are roughly consistent with a median warming of 
2.6–3.1 °C by 2100 (horizontal dark-orange range), and a 2.2–3.5 °C range 
including scenario projection uncertainty (horizontal light-orange range). 
Vertical dashed lines and shaded regions show year-2030 GHG estimates 
for the various scenario sets. c, Annual CO2 reduction rates modelled in 
scenarios limiting warming to below 2 °C from year-2030 INDC levels 
(dark-orange range in a; bars, median; vertical lines, spread across all 
available scenarios) and historical examples (range for France, Sweden 
and Denmark is based on ref. 74; see Supplementary Text 4). d, Implied 
cumulative carbon emissions including uncertainties, and comparison to 
budget ranges for not exceeding 1.5 °C (with 50% probability) and 2 °C 
(with 66% probability) from refs 9 and 11 (dark bar, lower estimate; light 
bar, high-range estimate). Historical estimates are from ref. 75. Vertical 
lines show the range due to scenario spread (Supplementary Text 3 and 
Supplementary Table 6). Arrows and bars in the first four columns show 
the projected cumulative CO2 emissions until 2030 for each respective 
scenario.
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with > 66% probability47. However, from current INDC levels, all available 
internally consistent scenarios manage to limit warming to below 2 °C 
with only a lower, 50%–66% probability, increasing the risks of climate 
change impacts. No scenarios are available that are consistent with both 
the current INDCs and a 1.5 °C warming limit with 50% probability.
The available scenarios show rapidly declining emissions after 2030, 
with global CO2 emissions from energy- and industry-related sources 
reaching net-zero levels between 2060 and 2080. The global economy is 
thus assumed to fully decarbonize17 in the time span of three to five dec-
ades and from 2030 levels that are higher than today’s. Furthermore, about 
two thirds of these scenarios achieve a balance of global GHG emissions 
(as mentioned in the Paris Agreement) between 2080 and 2100. Because 
some non-CO2 emissions are virtually impossible to eliminate entirely 
(for example, those from specific agricultural sources39), reaching such 
a balance will involve net-negative CO2 emissions48 at a global scale to 
compensate for any residual non-CO2 emissions17, resulting in gradual 
decline in global-average temperatures increase over time. Technologies 
that might be able to achieve this feat are still surrounded by important 
uncertainties (see below). In general, lower near-term emissions allow for 
a later timing of reaching global net-zero CO2 emissions17 (see 1.5–2 °C 
versus dark-orange range in Fig. 2a) and, moreover, reduce the overall 
future reliance on negative emissions technologies16,40,41.
To illustrate the challenges involved, we take a critical look at some 
characteristics of the scenarios. Scenarios that broadly follow the INDCs 
until 2030 and still manage to keep warming to below 2 °C (with 50%–
66% probability only) are associated with a very rapid decline in CO2 
emissions from energy- and industry-related sources after 2030. The 
decarbonization between 2030 and 2050 is particularly decisive in these 
scenarios40,45. For this period, the scenarios show average rates of decline 
in annual emissions of about 3.5% (2.0%–4.2%, full range across scenar-
ios; Supplementary Text 4). To understand what this means in a historical 
context, it makes sense to distinguish between (1) the phase-out of CO2 
generation over time (a proxy for the reduction in fossil-fuel use and 
upscaling of low-carbon energy sources) and (2) the required upscaling 
of industrial-scale CO2 sequestration with carbon capture and geological 
storage (CCS) technologies49,50. The latter mitigation option has not been 
applied in the past. It can thus be seen as an additional technological 
option that is included in scenarios, but that did not contribute to the 
past experiences.
In the 2 °C scenarios that start from INDC levels in 2030 (dark-orange 
range in Fig. 2a), CO2 generation is reduced at a median annual rate of 
about 2.3% (0.0%–3.3%, full range) between 2030 and 2050. Historically, 
countries have been able to achieve reductions in CO2 generation at rates 
of about 2%–3% per year as a result of dedicated (energy-security) pol-
icies40 (Fig. 2c; Supplementary Text 4). Limiting warming to below 2 °C 
from year-2030 INDC levels thus implies that the pace of such a precip-
itated phase-out of fossil-fuel use needs to be replicated globally. These 
historical reductions were all achieved for non-climate reasons, with a 
focus on energy security and not on emissions reductions. There is thus 
no clear historical analogue for reductions under a dedicated and strin-
gent climate policy. The challenge remains nevertheless important. This 
becomes even clearer when appreciating that all historical analogues for 
reductions were achieved in highly developed countries, such as France, 
Sweden and Denmark. Achieving similar results in developing coun-
tries, with energy-intensive sectors that are still growing and with weaker 
institutional frameworks, higher investment risks and less capacity, 
will be more difficult43, but, at the same time, readily available low-cost 
zero-carbon alternatives could also allow those economies to leap-frog 
carbon-intensive development in some sectors.
Scenarios complement the global phase-out of CO2 generation with 
a scale-up of CCS infrastructure to capture and geologically store part 
of the CO2 that continues to be generated. This scale-up is massive in 
scenarios that limit warming to below 2 °C from INDC levels. Because 
such scenarios have limited CCS deployment until 2030, the annual rate 
of CO2 sequestration is assumed to increase 10- to > 100-fold in the 2030– 
2050 period, reaching about 10 Gt CO2 yr−1 in 2050 (8–14 Gt CO2 yr−1 
range). To put this challenge into perspective, about 85 GW (meas-
ured in coal-equivalent power generation; Supplementary Text 4) 
of new CCS capacity would need to be installed each year to capture 
this amount by 2050, which corresponds roughly to the combined 
capacity of solar and wind power generation that is annually glob-
ally installed today51,52 (Supplementary Fig. 2). Altogether, the global 
energy-system transition that is required to limit warming to well below 
2 °C and further to 1.5 °C is unprecedented.
Finally, scenarios often combine CCS with biomass energy (abbreviated 
as BECCS) as a way of actively capturing and removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere. Although in principle this is technically possible, deploy-
ment of such technologies at scale is untested, and could be controver-
sial because of public acceptance53 or because of their competition with 
food production over land and water53,54. A recent review54 showed that, 
assuming agricultural practices and yields do not change over the twen-
ty-first century, removing CO2 could require large amounts of land. At the 
same time, other assessments39,55–57 concluded that it might be possible 
to produce the required amount of bio-energy in a sustainable way (up 
to 300 EJ yr−1, see box 11.5 in ref. 39). The importance of the land-use 
question for policy is highlighted by the decision of the IPCC to dedicate 
one of its three upcoming Special Reports to questions of sustainable land 
management and food security. Exploring futures in which a global bal-
ance of GHG emissions can be achieved in the second half of this century 
with technically feasible and societally acceptable technologies represents 
a major research challenge emerging from the Paris Agreement58. This 
challenge is particularly relevant to policy, because limiting emissions in 
2030 does not only increase the chances of attaining the 2 °C target, but 
also reduces the need to rely on unproven, potentially risky or controver-
sial technologies in the future16,40,59.
Decreasing the post-2030 challenge
The post-2030 challenge to limit warming to below 2 °C from current 
INDC levels is daunting, and pursuing efforts for 1.5 °C even more so. 
However, the overall challenge can be minimized by additional GHG 
reductions in the near-term16,40,41. In this context, near-term means 
before and by 2030. Besides (i) the option of countries increasing the 
overall ambition of their INDCs, we identify several other options 
that can contribute to this (see Table 2 for an overview). The options 
include: (ii) increasing the coverage of INDCs to more sectors and gases; 
(iii) including international sectors such as aviation and international 
maritime transport; (iv) implementing measures that enable over- 
delivery on the INDCs; (v) increasing contributions to international 
climate finance and international cooperation on technology develop-
ment, transfer and diffusion; and (vi) promoting and implementing addi-
tional national, sub-national and non-state initiatives. These options are 
not fully additional; some of them overlap (strongly) with the INDCs, 
and their precise contributions thus remain speculative (see Table 2). 
However, several indications suggest that such an increase in ambition 
is possible.
First, increasing ambition over time is a key component of the Paris 
Agreement framework. For example, countries are requested to submit 
new—or update existing—contributions that should represent a progres-
sion beyond their earlier commitments. The certainty of the new global 
climate agreement, together with the improving cost and availability of 
low-carbon technologies60, might help countries to consider strength-
ening their post-2020 contributions. Second, countries can undertake 
further domestic measures. Because many countries have undergone 
national stakeholder processes in preparation of their INDCs, they could 
now be in a better position to consider additional policies61. Sub-national 
actors such as cities and regional governments may take further action, 
and non-state actors can also help to overachieve INDCs. The Paris con-
ference saw unprecedented willingness to act by these stakeholders, with 
more than 1,000 non-state actors signing the Paris Pledge for Action 
(http://www.parispledgeforaction.org/), signalling that they are willing 
to support efforts to meet and exceed the ambition of governments for 
keeping the world on a 2 °C trajectory. This role of non-Party stakeholders 
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is acknowledged more clearly than ever before in the official Paris deci-
sions. However, although the theoretical potential of these activities is 
huge, their additional impact is very hard to quantify, and it remains 
unclear whether these initiatives are additional to the already pledged 
national contributions62–65.
Outlook
Covering most of the world’s GHG emissions with climate plans in the 
form of voluntarily submitted INDCs is a historic achievement. The 
Paris Agreement requires the submission of successive, increasingly 
ambitious, nationally determined contributions that are subject to strong 
 transparency guidelines, as well as a global stock-take, in the light of 
equity and science, every five years. The optimism accompanying this 
process has to be carefully balanced against the important challenges that 
current INDCs imply for post-2030 emissions reductions. Even starting 
today, limiting warming to no more than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial 
levels constitutes a societal challenge; at the same time, the warming 
projected from current INDCs constitutes an important challenge on 
its own in terms of coping with climate impacts. The nationally deter-
mined contributions constitute a new era for climate policy under the 
Paris Agreement, and represent both an invitation and a call for further 
action. Furthering greater reductions in the coming decade and preparing 
for a global transformation of development pathways is critical.
Two developments look particularly promising to us. First, it becomes 
increasingly clear to decision-makers that measures to reduce GHG 
emissions have multiple socio-economic benefits66. The action by vir-
tually all countries improves prospects for further collective action, 
which must be the fundamental basis of any adequate response to climate 
change. Therefore, it becomes easier to conceive additional measures or 
strengthen existing ones. Second, the recent unprecedented engagement 
of non-state actors such as businesses, citizens and religious organiza-
tions illustrates a more profuse awareness and an increased momentum 
for climate action. Given the large potential for emissions reductions 
as a result of both of these options, supporting and enabling national 
and non-state action will be critical. This insight also opens important 
avenues for future research and assessment. The research community 
will have to break from a one-sided climate-policy-centred approach 
and develop new concepts and frameworks that further the achievement 
of a portfolio of societal objectives, including climate, food and energy 
security, public health, and other goals of the sustainable development 
agenda67. Charting development pathways that can hold warming well 
below 2 °C will thus require a renewed effort of the social and physical 
science communities alike.
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